Child Sexual Assault: The Future of the Bill of Particulars and Plea in Bar after \u3ci\u3eState v. Martinez\u3c/i\u3e, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996) by Bush, Jeffrey H.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 4 Article 9
1997
Child Sexual Assault: The Future of the Bill of
Particulars and Plea in Bar after State v. Martinez,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996)
Jeffrey H. Bush
County Attorney, Burt County, Nebraska
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey H. Bush, Child Sexual Assault: The Future of the Bill of Particulars and Plea in Bar after State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d
655 (1996), 76 Neb. L. Rev. (1997)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol76/iss4/9
Jeffrey H. Bush*
Child Sexual Assault: The Future of
the Bill of Particulars and Plea in
Bar After State v. Martinez, 250
Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................... 873
II. Recent Developments ................................. 874
A. State v. Quick: The Problem Stated ............... 874
1. Quick and the "Clear Record" Rule ............. 874
2. Criticism of Quick ............................. 877
B. State v. Martinez: The Problem Resolved? . . . . . . . . .  879
1. Court of Appeals: Martinez I .................. 879
2. Criticism of Martinez I ......................... 882
C. Supreme Court: Martinez II ....................... 884
1. Limited Scope of Martinez II ................... 884
2. Issues Raised by Martinez II ................... 885
D. State v. Case: The Constitutional Protection of the
Bill of Particulars ................................. 887
1. Motion for a Bill of Particulars Treated as
Motion to Quash ............................... 887
2. Bill of Particulars and Double Jeopardy ........ 888
III. Historical Background of the Bill of Particulars and
Plea in Bar ........................................... 890
A. Federal Influence .................................. 891
B. English Background ............................... 893
1. Plea in Bar .................................... 893
2. Bill of Particulars ............................. 895
IV. The Problem with Quick .............................. 896
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REviEW.
County Attorney, Burt County, Nebraska. University of Nebraska, BA., 1980;
University of Nebraska College of Law, J.D., 1991; Executive Editor, Nebraska
Law Review, 1990-91; Judicial Clerk to Honorable William M. Connolly, Ne-
braska Court of Appeals, 1992; Private practice, 1993-94, specializing in criminal
law and litigation.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
V. Conclusion: A Few Proposals on Bill of Particulars
Issues ................................................ 898
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Nebraska cases, such as State v. Case,' raise the issue of
whether the bill of particulars will have continued vitality in child sex-
ual assault cases. In child sexual assault cases, courts generally have
relaxed certain procedural standards while still seeking to preserve
the defendant's right to due process. 2 The bill of particulars accom-
plishes this purpose by allowing a defendant to file a motion for a bill
of particulars to force the prosecution to set forth the time, place, man-
ner, and means of the crime charged. The purpose of this procedural
device is to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the charges
against him so he may prepare his defense.
With specific reference to the protection of double jeopardy, Ne-
braska courts have recognized in child sexual assault cases a "blanket
bar" to a second prosecution for assaults committed against the same
victim within the same time frame.3 This blanket bar is intended to
relax the requirement that the prosecution allege specific acts with
particularity, while protecting a defendant against prosecution for any
act committed within the time frame alleged. Courts sometimes hold
that a defendant's right to a bill of particulars is adequate protection
from vague allegations of sexual assault4 because a prosecutor is
forced to particularize what alleged acts the defendant committed
within a specific time frame. If there is a blanket bar, however, a
prosecutor may, in a single count, allege an indefinite series of acts
occurring within a specific time frame without being required to fur-
nish any particulars. Therefore, in this class of cases the blanket bar
makes a bill of particulars superfluous.
1. 4 Neb. Ct. App. 885, 553 N.W.2d 173 (1996).
2. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926 (Reissue 1995)(establishing procedures for
use of videotaped testimony of child victims); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805
(1990)(allowing use of videotaped testimony of child victims); State v. Craig, 219
Neb. 70, 76, 361 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1985)(admitting evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct because "evidence of repeated incidents may be especially relevant in
proving sexual crimes committed against persons otherwise defenseless due to
age-either the very young or the elderly").
3. See State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 541 N.W.2d 406 (1995), affd, 250 Neb.
597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
4. See, e.g., State v. Lawrinson, 551 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1990)(holding that in a pros-
ecution for gross sexual imposition of a minor, the State was required to furnish
the defendant with a bill of particulars identifying the specific week during which
the offense could have occurred, when the State had access to evidence that al-
lowed the State to narrow the date to within one week, and when the defendant
was prepared to submit evidence supporting his assertion that he could account




Two aspects of these cases may concern courts, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys. The first aspect is the limitation on a defendant's
right to a bill of particulars. 5 Second, these cases limit the State's
right to bring separate prosecutions for a series of transactions, and
courts may extend this limitation to criminal cases other than child
sexual assault cases. If these concerns have merit, then a defendant
will have difficulty receiving a bill of particulars, and prosecutors will
lose their traditional discretion to bring separate prosecutions for each
offense in a series of offenses.6
This Article discusses the bill of particulars in recent child sexual
assault cases. Part II provides a criticism of recent cases, emphasiz-
ing whether it was necessary for the courts to forge a new jurispru-
dence on the subject of bills of particulars. Part III discusses the
history of the bill of particulars in Nebraska. Part IV identifies the
specific problem giving rise to this change in the law. Finally, Part V
concludes with proposals for future treatment of these issues.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. State v. Quick: The Problem Stated
This Part discusses recent Nebraska cases on the bill of particulars
and concludes that courts have engaged in an unprecedented revision
of prior holdings. This revision of Nebraska jurisprudence on the bill
of particulars began in State v. Quick.7
1. Quick and the "Clear Record" Rule
In Quick, the State charged the defendant with one count of first
degree sexual assault under section 28-319(1)(c) of the Nebraska stat-
utes. The State alleged that the defendant, Gary Quick, subjected his
mentally retarded daughter to sexual penetration. Originally, the
State alleged the abuse occurred during a period from March 27, 1988
to April 9, 1988. By selecting this time frame, the State intended to
cover the last in a series of sexual assaults described by the child vic-
tim. The victim reported to authorities that Quick had abused her
approximately four times. The victim stated in a pretrial deposition
5. The limitation referred to is not explicitly stated in the cases, but can be inferred
because after Martinez II, no defendant can claim denial of a bill of particulars
will cause prejudice based solely on the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Martinez,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
6. It is well settled in Nebraska that a prosecuting attorney has the authority to
determine when to commence criminal action and what charges to file. See, e.g.,
State v. Bartlett, 210 Neb. 886, 317 N.W.2d 102 (1982); State v. White, 209 Neb.
218, 306 N.W.2d 906 (1982). The government need not prosecute separate of-
fenses together. See United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82 (8th Cir. 1995).
7. 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 511 N.W.2d 168 (1993), overruled by State v. Martinez, 250
Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
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that the last of the four assaults occurred within one week of April 9,
1988. At trial, the State intended to prove the fourth and final as-
sault,8 although the State offered evidence of the series of four
assaults.
During the trial, the victim stated that when all four assaults oc-
curred, her father would feign a heart attack and then would be trans-
ported by rescue squad to the hospital. But, the records of the
emergency medical personnel reflected only two occasions when Quick
was transported by rescue squad in 1987: on April 26 and August 4.
At the conclusion of the State's case, the State moved to amend the
information to conform to the evidence by changing the beginning date
of the time period from March 27, 1988 to April 25, 1987. This ex-
panded the time frame from two weeks to almost one year within
which the alleged sexual assault might have occurred.
The defendant was convicted and appealed, assigning as error the
trial court's ruling to allow the amendment of the information. In de-
ciding the issues involved in the appeal, the court applied State v. Pis-
korski.9 The facts in Piskorski involved a complaint in county court
that initially charged that "[o]n or about December, 1982,.. . Piskor-
ski... subject[ed] [the victim] to sexual penetration.., in violation of
Section 28-319(1)(a)."'1o The next day, the State filed an amended
complaint.1 ' The State then filed an information particularizing the
time frame to allege that the offense had occurred "[o]n or after De-
cember 11, 1982 and before December 25, 1982."12 Before trial, Pis-
korski's motion to quash the information as too vague was denied, and
the trial began. At the close of the State's case, the information was
amended over objection to further expand the time frame "to allege
that the assault occurred on or after September 1, 1982, and before
December 25, 1982."3
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Piskorski argued that
because the State introduced evidence of several occasions between
September and December when Piskorski may have assaulted the vic-
tim, he could not know which specific act was involved in his convic-
tion and which act was barred. The supreme court found this
argument meritless, stating that a defendant "may go outside the in-
8. While the State thought it would prove just one assault, the court did not find
this persuasive on the double jeopardy issue.
9. 218 Neb. 543, 357 N.W.2d 206 (1984).
10. Id. at 544, 357 N.W.2d at 208-09.
11. The only difference between the two complaints was that in the amended com-
plaint the name of the victim was deleted and the State alleged that the crime
was committed by subjecting a person younger than 16 years of age to sexual
penetration in violation of § 28-319(1)(c), rather than § 28-319(1)(a). See NEB.
REv. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a), (c) (Reissue 1995).




formation itself to determine what charge the conviction was based
upon in order to raise it as a bar to a subsequent prosecution."' 4
The court found that in Piskorski's case, the jury had been in-
structed that it could arrive at a guilty verdict based only on an inci-
dent when the mother was present, and the child's testimony could be
corroborated.' 5 The jury had been instructed not to consider any
other incident described in the child's testimony because such inci-
dents "completely lack[ed] any corroboration and the defendant was
never identified as the actor therein."' 6 In short, the record was clear
that only one incident occurred when the mother was present, and
thus the defendant could determine which act resulted in the convic-
tion and thus was a bar to further prosecution.' 7
The appeals court in Quick distinguished Piskorski on the ground
that in Piskorski, "the Supreme Court recited facts specific to the rec-
ord in Piskorski's case that clearly identified the particular act for
which Piskorski was convicted."' 8 By contrast, in Quick, the court of
appeals could not determine from the record the occasion of alleged
criminal conduct for which the defendant had been convicted. The
court of appeals read Piskorski as standing for the proposition that
"[wihen a conviction could be based on any of two or more occasions of
indistinguishable criminal conduct alleged at trial, the record must
clearly indicate which occasion of criminal conduct supports the con-
viction in order for the judgment to serve as a bar to future
prosecution."' 9
Applying the rule derived from Piskorski to the facts in Quick, the
court of appeals reasoned as follows:
We are unable to conceive of facts, within or outside the record, that Quick
could use to prove that a future prosecution for first degree sexual assault of
the victim would be barred by the conviction now before us .... If faced with
a future prosecution for sexual assault of the victim, Quick might file a bill of
14. Id. at 548, 357 N.W.2d at 210 (citing Cowan v. State, 140 Neb. 837, 2 N.W.2d 111
(1942)). The court also stated that
[a]n indictment or information alone need not be full protection
against double jeopardy because a defendant may allege and prove facts
outside the record in support of a plea of former adjudication. The rem-
edy of a bill of particulars is available to assist a defendant in preparing
his defense and to protect him against a second prosecution for the same
offense.
Id. at 548, 357 N.W.2d at 210-11 (internal citation omitted)(quoting State v. Ad-
ams, 181 Neb. 75, 79, 247 N.W.2d 144, 149 (1966)). The court also noted that
"other jurisdictions addressing this question have reached similar conclusions."
Id. at 548, 357 N.W.2d at 211 (listing other jurisdictions with similar holdings).
15. Id. at 549, 357 N.W.2d at 211.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. State v. Quick, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 764, 511 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1993), overruled
by State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
19. Id. at 765, 511 N.W.2d at 172.
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particulars to force the State to specify which assault was being alleged in the
subsequent prosecution. However, the State could pick whichever alleged as-
sault it preferred. The factual pattern of each of the alleged assaults is identi-
cal. In Piskorski, the defendant could rely on a distinguishing fact to prevent
the State from prosecuting him for the same assault for which he already had
been convicted. In the case before us, there would be no way for Quick to
prove that he had already been convicted of the assault alleged in a subse-
quent prosecution.
2 0
Therefore, the court reversed Quick's conviction and remanded the
case for retrial.
2 1
2. Criticism of Quick
If Quick's conviction was reversed because of prejudice to his sub-
stantive rights, then the court can be criticized for failing to indicate
how the defendant in Quick could show prejudice resulting from the
overbroad information until a subsequent prosecution was actually
underway.2 2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor would
bring a second prosecution based on the facts in Quick.
Beyond this obvious shortcoming, however, a more serious flaw of
Quick is that it derives from Piskorski the rule that the record must
clearly indicate which occasion of criminal conduct supports the con-
viction be for the judgment will bar future prosecution. The Quick
court illogically derives this rule from Piskorski by arguing that if a
conviction could be based on two or more acts, then a reviewing court
must know which act supports the conviction. In fact, as Martinez2 3
will point out, Piskorski does not support this proposition.2 4
Nevertheless, the Quick court reasoned that Piskorski implied that
a subsequent prosecution was barred if, and only if, the record of the
former proceeding made clear which of two or more acts formed the
20. Id. at 767, 511 N.W.2d at 173-74.
21. Id. at 768, 511 N.W.2d at 174.
22. See, e.g., State v. Demon, 614 A.2d 1342 (N.H. 1992)(holding that in a prosecution
for aggravated felonious assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the father's motion for a bill of particulars when the motion made no
specific claim of the need for an exact date to avoid prejudice and mentioned no
double jeopardy concern).
23. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 200, 541 N.W.2d 406, 412 (1995), affd,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996). Martinez I, however, does not draw the
correct conclusion from Piskorski either. See infra subsection II.B.2. What Pis-
korski does state is that a court looks to more than just the information when
deciding when prosecution is barred. Thus, an overly general information is not
per se defective. By using facts outside the record in addition to the information
in asserting former jeopardy, a defendant is aided by the bill of particulars, which
forces the prosecution to particularize its allegations. The bill, in conjunction
with the hearing provided by § 29-1817, was held adequate to protect the defend-
ant in Piskorski.
24. See State v. Milenkovich, 236 Neb. 42, 49, 458 N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (1990)(cita-




basis for the conviction. It thus concluded that the trial record always
must show evidentiary earmarks that will exclude all but one act as
the basis for conviction.25 For the sake of brevity, this doctrine will be
referred to as "a clear record."
The logical fallacy in Quick is its reliance on Piskorski for the prop-
osition that a clear record necessarily and sufficiently protects a de-
fendant from double jeopardy if, and only if, the record necessarily
excludes all but one instance as the basis of conviction. 26 But, Piskor-
ski in fact states only that a clear record is sufficient to protect a de-
fendant from double jeopardy. Other facts, which may be gathered
"outside the record,"27 also may afford a defendant double jeopardy
protection even in the absence of a clear record. The Quick court ig-
nored the significance of facts "outside the record," and fallaciously
leapt to the conclusion that "the record must clearly indicate which
occasion of criminal conduct supports the conviction."28
The Quick court was oblivious to the procedural tradition repre-
sented in Piskorski,29 which incorporates both the hearing on the plea
in bar and the bill of particulars. Although the court wrote that
"Quick might file a bill of particulars to force the State to specify
which assault was being alleged in the subsequent prosecution,3o it
did not accept this as sufficient. The Quick court ignored the rule that
the State must furnish exact dates only when that information is
within the State's possession. 31 Even if the bill of particulars could
not be granted, Quick nevertheless could call the victim at the hearing
as authorized by section 29-1817 and require the victim to testify as to
25. State v. Quick, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 767, 511 N.W.2d 168, 174 (1993), overruled
by State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
26. Martinez I further dilutes this and allows a conviction to furnish double jeopardy
protection if the record conceivably excludes all acts but one. See State v. Marti-
nez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 202, 541 N.W.2d 406, 413 (1995), af/'d, 250 Neb. 597,
550 N.W.2d 655 (1996). "Thus, although the record contains evidence of more
than one assault, there is only one count charged, and there is evidence which
defines with reasonable certainty the time and place of at least one assault-the
first one-while the mother was away in treatment." Id.
27. See State v. Piskorski, 218 Neb. 543, 548, 357 N.W.2d 206, 210-11 (1984)(citing
State v. Adams, 181 Neb. 75, 79, 147 N.W.2d 144, 149 (1966)(citing Myers v.
United States, 15 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1926))).
28. State v. Quick, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 765, 511 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1993), overruled
by State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
29. See infra Part IH. "A plea in bar sets forth matters which per se destroy [a] right
of action and bar[s] its prosecution absolutely, such as [the] bar of statute of limi-
tations or constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination." BLAcies LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1037 (5th ed. 1979). This general term encompasses the defense of
double jeopardy. The plea does not go to the merits of the case, and if proved,
provides a complete bar to the action.
30. State v. Quick, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 767, 511 N.W.2d 168, 174 (1993), overruled
by State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).




whether or not she could distinguish between the incidents. If the vic-
tim could not make the distinction, then subsequent action would be
barred.
The problem in Quick was that the prosecution was faced with a
child witness who could not distinguish between incidents. This also
was the case in Piskorski, and it is not uncommon in child sexual as-
sault cases.32 The unfortunate result in Quick, unlike Piskorski,
would make prosecution of child sexual assault cases in most in-
stances impossible.
B. State v. Martinez: The Problem Resolved?
1. Court of Appeals: Martinez I
In State v. Martinez,33 another panel of the court of appeals reex-
amined the issues raised by Quick. The panel rejected Quick's reason-
ing, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.34 Martinez raises a
number of issues: (1) Can the blanket bar be limited to child sexual
assault cases? (2) Is it proper to use the "duplicitous information anal-
ysis" to distinguish Quick from Piskorski, that is, is it a correct read-
ing of Piskorski? (3) Is the law left with a redundant two-fold analysis
consisting of (a) the blanket bar, and (b) the requirement of a clear
record?
In Martinez, the victim, then five years old, lived with his babysit-
ter from July 14 to August 12, 1991, when his mother was hospitalized
for inpatient alcohol treatment. The defendant, Martinez, lived with
the child's babysitter, who cared for the child from July 1991 to Au-
gust 1993. The child was eight years old and in the second grade at
the time of trial. At trial, the State introduced hearsay evidence of the
child's statements. The jury heard an audiotape of an interview with
the child, in which the child indicated that the first time the defendant
hurt him was while the child was staying with Martinez and the baby-
sitter during the month his mother had gone to Hastings "to stop
drinking." While the child could not remember how many acts of sex-
ual penetration occurred, he did testify to the various acts, and he
"stated that he was in kindergarten the first time that Martinez did
this to him."35
The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict as to the second and third counts of the information for first de-
gree assault and sexual assault of a child. The jury found Martinez
32. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRMIuNAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(f), at
459 (1984).
33. 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 541 N.W.2d 406 (1995), affd, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655
(1996).
34. State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
35. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 195, 541 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1995), affd,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
1997] 879
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
guilty on the remaining count of first degree sexual assault. Martinez
appealed, arguing that the jury instruction allowed the State to prove
the first degree sexual assault happened sometime between July 1,
1991 and September 1, 1993, which Martinez argued was insufficient
to bar a future prosecution for the same criminal conduct.
3 6
The court first found that the information was sufficient in the
sense that "[a]n information which alleges the commission of a crime
using the language of the statute which defines that crime is generally
sufficient."3 7 The court noted, however, that under the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, an information "must apprise
a defendant with reasonable certainty of the charge against him so
that he may prepare a defense to the prosecution and be able to plead
the judgment of conviction as a bar to a later prosecution for the same
offense."3 8 The court referred to this as the "Bartell rule," based on
the eponymous United States Supreme Court case.3 9 The Nebraska
Court of Appeals believed the issue was whether or not the informa-
tion satisfied the Bartell rule.
To resolve this issue, the court applied the "duplicitous informa-
tion" standard set forth in State v. Saraceno.40 The defendant faced
multiple counts of sexual assault, each of which involved indistin-
guishable yet individual incidents occurring over a period of years.
The second and third counts, for which the defendant was convicted,
alleged the defendant committed the crime of fellatio with a minor be-
tween August 1980 and August 1983, "on divers uncertain dates" and
36. Id. at 197, 541 N.W.2d at 410.
37. Id. at 196, 541 N.W.2d at 410.
38. Id. at 197, 541 N.W.2d at 410-11.
39. Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913). Bartell was adopted by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Cowan v. State, 140 Neb. 837, 840-41, 2 N.W.2d 111,
113-14 (1942).
[A]n indictment or information meets all constitutional requirements (1)
if it shows that the acts which defendants is [sic] charged with commit-
ting amounted to a crime which the court had power to punish, and that
it was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (2) if it
informs the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, and (3) if
it constitutes a record from which it can be determined whether a subse-
quent proceeding is barred by the former adjudication. And to the third
requirement, it cannot be said that the indictment or information alone
must be full protection against double jeopardy, for the reason that in
many cases, such as where several acts constitute a single crime, the
defendant is often required to allege facts outside the record to support
his plea of former adjudication. If the information or indictment ap-
prises the defendant with reasonable certainty of the accusation against
him so that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, it meets the fundamen-
tal purposes of an information or indictment, as well as constitutional
requirements.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. 545 A.2d 1116, 1120-21 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
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"on divers uncertain days."4 ' In Saraceno, the Connecticut Court of
Appeals stated that "'[diuplicity occurs when two or more offenses are
charged in a single count of an accusatory instrument.'"4 2 The court
held that the information was not duplicitous because (1) each count
contained only a single set of essential elements, (2) a jury was pre-
cluded from returning a verdict that was not unanimous, (3) only a
single statute was involved in each count, and (4) the counts suffi-
ciently delineated the crimes charged and the time frames so the state
could not subsequently raise the same charges within the designated
time frames. 4
3
Relying on Saraceno, the Martinez court decided that Piskorski
was a "one count-one act"4 4 case, and not a duplicitous information
case. The Martinez court reasoned that (1) the Quick court misinter-
preted Piskorski as compelling the state to fie a nonambiguous infor-
mation; (2) such issues usually are analyzed under a duplicitous
information analysis; (3) but Piskorski was a "one count-one act"
case, not a "duplicitous information case."4 5 Therefore, the Martinez
court stated that "Piskorski could [not] properly be used as a 'spring-
board' for the broad proposition of law laid down by the court in State
v. Quick."46
Yet, as argued above,4 7 Quick requires a clear record merely be-
cause of the factual peculiarities of Piskorski, and nothing in Martinez
indicates otherwise. For instance, the court concluded that the facts
in Martinez could be distinguished from Quick because the Martinez
trial court had limited the time frame in its jury instructions, as had
the court in Piskorski.48 The court stated that
[t]he case at hand is factually closer to Piskorski than to Quick. Here, [the
victim] testified that Martinez assaulted him more than once, but never speci-
fied how many times. He did, however, testify that it first happened in the
babysitter's garage while he was in kindergarten, and his statement to the
investigating officer (received in evidence) was that the first time was while
his mother was receiving treatment "to stop drinking." Thus, although the
41. Id. at 1119 n.1.
42. Id. at 1120 (quoting A. SPINELLA, CONNEcTIcuT CRII3INAL PROCEDURE 406 (1985)).
43. Id. at 1120-21. While the court relies on Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377
(1975), it does not appear to support anything like a blanket bar.
44. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 201, 541 N.W.2d 406, 413 (1995), aft'd,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
45. Id. at 201, 541 N.W.2d at 413.
46. Id. at 201, 541 N.W.2d at 412-13.
47. See supra subsection ILA.2 and the text accompanying notes 15-16.
48. See State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 197, 541 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1995).
The information had charged that the first degree sexual assault had
occurred "between July 1, 1991 and June 18, 1994." However, the trial
court limited the time frame in the instructions to the period when the
victim was being babysat at the house where Martinez also resided:
July 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993.
1997]
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record contains evidence of more than one assault, there is only one count
charged, and there is evidence which defines with reasonable certainty the
time and place of at least one assault-the first one-while the mother was
away in treatment. Accordingly, the instant case is not an allegedly duplici-
tous information case such as Saraceno .... 49
The appeals court in Martinez concluded that Piskorski was not
duplicitous because only one incident could furnish the basis for con-
viction, which was the same conclusion reached in Quick.5O Based on
its reading of Piskorski, however, the Martinez court drew a conclu-
sion completely at odds with Quick.
When only one sexual assault within the charging period is determinable as
having occurred during that period by linkage to another event, which then
furnishes a reasonably definite time for an offense, the requirement of the
Double Jeopardy Clause that the defendant be able to plead the conviction as
a bar to further prosecution is satisfied when used in conjunction with a "blan-
ket bar" for the time period in the charging information.5 1
2. Criticism of Martinez I
Two rather obvious criticisms can be used to attack Martinez I:
neither the duplicitous information analysis nor the blanket bar are
mentioned in Piskorski. While duplicity is never mentioned in Piskor-
ski, the Martinez court reasoned somewhat plausibly that in Piskor-
ski, the assault occurred while the mother was present, which was the
only basis for conviction. Thus, a clear record protected the defendant
for double jeopardy purposes. Piskorski's clear record precluded du-
plicity in the Martinez court's view. Similarly in Martinez, the first
assault occurred while the victim's mother was absent and while the
victim was in kindergarten. Thus, the court reasoned that the defend-
ant could read the record and establish that he had been convicted for
the first assault.52
The Martinez court also concluded that "the bar to future prosecu-
tions must of necessity extend to the entire time period in the informa-
tion."53 If the Martinez court's analysis of Piskorski was correct and
49. Id. at 201-02, 541 N.W.2d at 413.
50. Id. at 201, 541 N.W.2d at 413.
51. Id. at 205, 541 N.W.2d at 414-15. This language will be echoed by the court in
Martinez I. See State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 599, 550 N.W.2d 655, 657
(1996)("[W]here an information provides a time frame which has a distinct begin-
ning and an equally clear end within which the crimes are alleged to have been
committed, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.").
52. While nothing in Martinez compelled this conclusion, at least it is conceivable
that a court could exclude all acts but one to support the conviction. This is
where Martinez stakes new ground: while Quick requires that the record neces-
sarily exclude all acts but one, Martinez requires only that the record conceivably
exclude all acts but one.
53. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 205, 541 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1995), affld,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
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sufficient to resolve the issue, then it would be disingenuous for the
court to extend a blanket bar to the defendant.
Unstated in the appeals court's analysis is that the court had to
extend the blanket bar because of the precedent set by Quick. To ac-
cept Quick as precedent, the panel in Martinez would have to reverse.
To get around Quick, the Martinez court essentially rewrote Piskorski:
the Martinez court inferred from Piskorski the duplicitous information
and blanket bar analysis.
First, Piskorski does not implicate a duplicitous information analy-
sis. In Martinez I, the court concluded that Piskorski was not based on
a duplicitous information because one specific act furnished the basis
for conviction.54 The supreme court in Piskorski held that it was clear
which act would be barred from future prosecution because the trial
court instructed the jury to ignore the evidence of all other acts.
5 5
Otherwise, the information alone, as in Quick and Martinez, would
not clearly indicate which act had formed the basis for conviction.
56
Second, Piskorski does not support the blanket bar. While a clear rec-
ord was sufficient to protect the defendant from subsequent prosecu-
tion for one act, the State was not precluded from prosecuting the
other acts supported by testimony, i.e., there was no blanket bar in
Piskorski. In fact, the Piskorski court did not concern itself with
whether the defendant could be prosecuted at a later time for the
other acts implicated in the first trial. Martinez I does not consider
the implication of Piskorski, namely, that the defendant could be rep-
rosecuted for all acts except one.
5 7
54. Id. at 201, 541 N.W.2d at 413.
55. State v. Piskorski, 218 Neb. 543, 548-49, 357 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1984).
56. It is important to note how fundamentally similar all three cases are. Martinez,
like Quick, involved multiple acts and some evidence that defined the time frame
of one act. Yet, it was impossible to identify the act for which Martinez was con-
victed, as was the case in Piskorski, when the jury was instructed that it must
convict for one act or not at all. The precedent set by Quick would still compel the
Martinez court to reverse because the jury in Martinez was not instructed to con-
vict for one act or not at all. In Quick, the victim testified to four separate acts,
and the defendant faced one charge in the information. The incidents were indis-
tinguishable except the victim stated that she remembered the assaults occurred
when the ambulance came, and the rescue squad personnel testified the ambu-
lance responded twice. The record presented to the court of appeals did not nec-
essarily imply that one rescue call formed the basis for the conviction and would
serve as a bar. Similarly, in Martinez the record did not necessarily imply that
one act in the period from 1991 to 1993 formed the basis for the conviction. The
court merely found it conceivable that the first act formed the basis for conviction.
57. State v. Piskorstd, 218 Neb. 543, 549, 357 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1984). The record
clearly indicates that only one such event occurred while the mother was present,
although other violations not charged in the information may have occurred.
Therefore, it would not be difficult to establish which act resulted in the convic-
tion and is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
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Martinez, therefore, presents a redundant amalgamation between
the clear record of Quick ("linkage to another event"58) and the blan-
ket bar. If the defendant has the blanket bar, it does not matter for
double jeopardy purposes whether or not there is a clear record. The
only significance of a clear record post-Martinez is that it allows the
State to prove that the alleged act occurred within the time frame al-
leged. Reliance on a clear record is superfluous in the face of the blan-
ket bar.
Piskorski's requirement that the time and place of an assault be
particularized and corroborated by reference to another fact was based
on the tradition of the proceeding in section 29-1817 and the bill of
particulars. In Martinez I, section 29-1817 and the bill of particulars
were ignored in favor of the broader protection given by the blanket
bar. Presumably, after acquittal or conviction, the State cannot bring
a later prosecution unless new evidence demonstrates that acts within
the time frame are distinct from the former acts. One reasonably may
ask whether trial courts in Nebraska will be able to limit the new
analysis to child sexual assault cases.
C. Supreme Court: Martinez II
1. Limited Scope of Martinez II
To clarify the conflict between Quick and Martinez I, the State peti-
tioned the supreme court for further review of the court of appeals'
decision in Martinez J.59 Although the supreme court adopted the
blanket bar in Martinez I, the supreme court's opinion did not endorse
all of the reasoning of Martinez I.
The supreme court's analysis is significant because it is limited
solely to the notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment and resolv-
ing the conflict between Quick and Martinez I on that issue alone.60
"The question, then, on which the decisions of the Court of Appeals
differed was whether the information, as limited by the trial court, i.e.,
from July 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993, satisfied the Bartell stan-
dard."61 Martinez 11 returns to the traditional rationale of the plea in
58. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 205, 541 N.W.2d 406, 414 (1995), aftd,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
59. In its petition, the State urged further review because the statutes governing the
court of appeals do not preclude disagreement among panels, and no mechanism
entitled the entire court to sit en banc to overrule an individual panel's decision.
See State's Petition for Further Review and Memorandum Brief at 2, State v.
Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 541 N.W.2d 406 (1995)(No. A-95-019).
60. The State's petition for review requested the supreme court to resolve the conflict
on the blanket bar, which requires consideration only of the Sixth Amendment.
61. State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 599, 550 N.W.2d 655, 657 (1996).
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bar found in Piskorski,62 but its limited scope does not allow it to ad-
dress how procedures will be changed by the blanket bar.
The supreme court first noted that "[u]nder Piskorski, an informa-
tion or indictment is not rendered invalid when the State presents evi-
dence of several violations .. to secure one conviction."63 The court
rejected as unconscionable the Quick court's "policy"64 that an infor-
mation cannot allege a time frame to compensate for the vagaries of a
child's memory. The supreme court endorsed the court of appeals'
analysis in Martinez I as consistent 65 with Piskorski inasmuch as "a
trial court in a subsequent prosecution may tailor double jeopardy pro-
tection to reflect the time period involved in the charge in the first
prosecution."66 The supreme court reasoned that "a defendant may
allege and prove facts outside of the record in support of his plea of
former adjudication."67 Therefore, Martinez II instructs a trial court
to use the traditional protection offered by the plea in bar.
The supreme court went beyond Piskorski, however, and adopted
the following policy, which it held was consistent with Piskorski:
Unless the offense charged in the second prosecution is clearly separate and
apart from the offense charged in the first prosecution, the time frame alleged
in the first prosecution acts as a 'blanket bar' for subsequent prosecutions.
This is the only viable means of balancing the profound tension between the
constitutional rights of one accused of child molestation against the State's
interest in protecting those victims who need the most protection. 68
This new policy is unsupported by Piskorski and therefore alters for-
mer law because the State was not barred from reprosecuting
Piskorski.69
2. Issues Raised by Martinez II
Martinez 11 presents significant differences from Martinez I, partic-
ularly the lack of reliance on the clear record doctrine. The opinion
62. Significantly, the bill of particulars is absent.
63. State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 600, 550 N.W.2d 655, 658 (1996).
64. Id. at 601, 550 N.W.2d at 658.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 600, 550 N.W.2d at 657.
68. Id. at 601, 550 N.W.2d at 658. The court provided the following reasoning:
It is preferable to allow the State to conduct one vigorous prosecution
to protect a child rather than to bar any prosecution at all because of a
child's natural mnemonic shortcomings. If, at the time the information
is filed, the State knows of all facts and all possible charges arising from
one transaction or series of transactions within a time frame, and if
nothing prevents the State from filing all charges in one information,
then there is no reason why the State need attempt a series of prosecu-
tions of one charge at a time rather than prosecute all charges at once.
Id.
69. See supra subsection 11.B.2.
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holds that either the instances charged 7O and proved at trial must be
clearly separate or the defendant receives the benefit of the blanket
bar.71 Martinez II appears to recognize that Martinez I is muddled on
this point. Martinez I allowed the benefit of the blanket bar precisely
because the instances were indistinguishable, yet at the same time
Martinez I stated that the record must be made clear by reference to
extrinsic or corroborating evidence.
A further difference between the opinions is that Martinez H self-
consciously limits its decision to resolve the issue of what notice must
be provided in an information for Sixth Amendment purposes. But,
this limited scope leaves unresolved issues concerning the bill of par-
ticulars or the plea in bar. First, while Martinez II states the tradi-
tional rule that a defendant may allege and prove facts outside the
record, it never mentions the bill of particulars as a means of securing
double jeopardy protection. Second, if the blanket bar exists, is a de-
fendant ever entitled to a bill of particulars? While the blanket bar
may be consistent with Piskorski, it is inconsistent with the Piskorski
rule that a bill gives the defendant double jeopardy protection.
Therefore, questions will arise in cases in which the State alleges a
time frame and the defendant asks for a bill of particulars. In this
context, double jeopardy arguments fail because the standard for rul-
ing on the motion is abuse of discretion:72 unless the defendant can
show prejudice, he cannot demonstrate that a trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for a bill. But if there is a blanket
bar, there never can be prejudice.
A bill of particulars can serve purposes other than preventing
double jeopardy violations. For instance, a bill gives notice of the
charges so the defendant can prepare his defense. If a defendant re-
quests the bill of particulars for notice purposes, when should a trial
court grant the motion? A bill also limits what the State can prove at
the trial to the incidents specified in the bill. But should the State
ever be limited in light of the policy of Martinez II?
Another question raised by Martinez 11 is whether its policy of the
blanket bar will apply to types of cases other than child sexual as-
sault. Other instances of criminal conduct must, of necessity, be indis-
tinguishable from child sexual assault cases. For instance, in
pollution cases, when contamination occurs sporadically over a period
of time, the prosecution may allege a time frame rather than specific
70. Presumably the court's holding still determines what is barred based on proof
presented at trial, and the information alone is not determinative. Therefore, the
issue remains as to whether the incidents the State proves at trial are the only
ones that are barred, leaving uncharged incidents about which no proof is offered
available for later prosecution.
71. State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 601, 550 N.W.2d 655, 658 (1996).
72. See 2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 32, § 19.2(f), at 459-61; Teillier, supra note 31.
886 [Vol. 76:872
BILL OF PARTICULARS
instances. Is the polluter entitled to a blanket bar? Or, should a de-
fendant attack vagueness under another theory, such as duplicity? Is
there a rationale for entitling the polluter to a bill of particulars?
Some of these questions are raised, but not answered in State v.
Case.
D. State v. Case: The Constitutional Protections of the Bill
of Particulars
In State v. Case,73 the defendant was charged with three counts of
sexual contact with a child and four counts of first degree assault of a
child. The defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty to all seven
counts. After arraignment, but before trial, the defendant asked for a
bill of particulars, claiming the charges were too vague to use his con-
viction as a bar to future prosecution. The trial court denied the mo-
tion, and after conviction the defendant assigned the decision as error.
The court of appeals affirmed and drew an important distinction be-
tween the bill for notice purposes and for double jeopardy purposes.
74
1. Motion for a Bill of Particulars Treated as Motion to Quash
The first issue the Case court considered was whether the court
should have granted a motion for a bill of particulars to satisfy the
notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment. The defendant asserted
that he had "a constitutional right to be adequately informed of the
charges against him,"75 but the court of appeals decided that the de-
fendant failed to properly preserve the error. "When a defendant
wishes to challenge the certainty and particularity of the information
for the preparation of his defense, a motion to quash is the proper
method of attack."7 6 "To the extent that Case is arguing that he may
have been hindered in his ability to prepare his defense because of the
language of the information, he waived the right to challenge the lan-
guage by pleading not guilty at arraignment."77
Thus, instead of addressing a question left from Martinez II, i.e.,
the extent to which the Sixth Amendment requires a bill of particu-
lars, the court in Case took a detour. The court incorrectly assumed
Case was asserting that the information was defective, rather than
asserting that he needed a bill of particulars to have notice and to
prepare his defense. The court then concluded that a motion to quash
was the proper procedural device.
73. 4 Neb. Ct. App. 885, 553 N.W.2d 173 (1996).
74. Id. at 893, 553 N.W.2d at 180.
75. Id. at 891-92, 553 N.W.2d at 179.
76. Id. at 892, 553 N.W.2d at 179.
77. Id. at 893, 553 N.W.2d at 180.
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The court correctly asserted that a motion for a bill of particulars
was the inappropriate vehicle to challenge a defective information. As
the court stated in Commonwealth v. March,78 "[tihe function of a bill
of particulars... is to give notice to the accused of the offense charged
in order to permit him to prepare a defense, avoid surprise, and be
placed on notice as to any restrictions upon the Commonwealth's
proof."79 The court also pointed out that "[a] motion for a bill of partic-
ulars does not question the sufficiency of an indictment or informa-
tion, but, rather assumes its validity." 0
In Case, the defendant was neither questioning the validity of the
information nor asserting the information was defective because it
lacked particularity. The court of appeals assumed this and relied on
State v. Bocian8 ' for the rule that "[aill defects which may be excepted
to by a motion to quash are considered waived by a defendant pleading
the general issue."8 2 Yet, Bocian was not a case in which the defend-
ant complained that he was erroneously denied a bill of particulars.8 3
In fact, the Bocian court stated that "[t]he record does not disclose any
motions addressed to the trial judge requesting a more specific state-
ment of the charges."8 4
Instead, Case asserted that he needed the bill of particulars to sat-
isfy the notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment. As the court
stated in Martinez I, the constitutional requirements of the Bartell
rule are not waived when a defendant pleads the general issue and
proceeds to trial "because the sufficiency of the information for double
jeopardy purposes may require reference to the record, which obvi-
ously does not exist at the time of arraignment, as well as reference to
facts outside the record, which is permissible, and any second prosecu-
tion is obviously a future event."'5 Therefore, to the extent Case was
asserting he could not prepare his defense because of a lack of particu-
larity, his remedy would be a bill of particulars, not a motion to quash.
2. Bill of Particulars and Double Jeopardy
An anomaly of Case is that the court distinguished two functions of
the bill of particulars: (1) to cure a vague or defective information so
the defendant may prepare a defense, and (2) to prevent double jeop-
78. 551 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
79. Id. at 235-36.
80. Id. at 235.
81. 226 Neb. 613, 617, 413 N.W.2d 893, 896 (1987).
82. Id.
83. The error assigned in Bocian was that the information subjected the defendant to
multiple prosecutions for the same act in violation of double jeopardy. Id.
84. Id.
85. State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 198, 541 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1995), affd,
250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996)(citations omitted).
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ardy.8 6 The court defined the parameters of its opinion by restricting
its analysis to "whether this conviction must be reversed because Case
was denied a bill of particulars and the charging information was not
particular enough to enable Case to use these convictions as a bar to
future prosecution."8 7 This was an easy case in light of Martinez I
and required nothing more than an application of the blanket bar.
In the event a future prosecution against Case for sexually assaulting the son
is undertaken by the State, Case will be able to plead that further prosecution
based on a sexual assault of the son during any of the time periods set out in
the five counts of the amended information is barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because of the "blanket bar."
8 8
It was novel for the court to divide the bill's functions to provide
notice and to provide protection from double jeopardy. Likewise, the
court's treatment of the motion for the bill as equivalent to a motion to
quash was a novel approach. Its treatment of the bill as a guarantee
against double jeopardy derived from Quick, while its novel assimila-
tion of the bill to the motion to quash was explicable in light of Marti-
nez II, which left no role for the "incredible shrinking" bill.89
86. State v. Case, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 865, 893, 553 N.W.2d 173, 180 (1996).
87. Id. at 895, 553 N.W.2d at 181.
88. Id.
89. The outcome in Case would not have been different had the defendant moved to
quash the information.
In the absence of demonstrated prejudice to a defendant's substantial
right, a formal charge in prosecuting a criminal offense-an indictment,
information, or complaint-alleging a date or period within the statutory
time specified to commence prosecution for the crime charged is suffi-
cient, unless the particular offense charged requires establishment of a
specific time as an essential element of that crime charged.
State v. Wehrle, 223 Neb. 928, 934,395 N.W.2d 142, 147 (1986). The trial court's
denial of the bill also was not prejudicial to Case's right to notice of the charges.
To the extent a bill would be required for notice purposes, most courts have held
that it is not. See United States v. Noetzel, 124 F.R.D. 518 (D. Mass. 1989); State
v. Mazzetta, 574 A.2d 806 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Harris, 543 N.E.2d
859 (11. App. Ct. 1989)(holding that because the victim was young and the acts
occurred over a period of six months, the dates provided were as specific as possi-
ble); State v. Ross, 561 So. 2d 1004 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Varney, 641 A.2d
185 (Me. 1994)(holding that in a prosecution for gross sexual assault of his eight-
year-old daughter, the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars providing exact
dates of occurrences was properly denied because the daughter was unable to
specify exact dates); Commonwealth v. Giannopoulos, 612 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993); State v. Voorhees, 632 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1993); State v. Demon, 614
A.2d 1342 (N.H. 1992).
The defendant in Case failed to show prejudice to win his motion for the bill.
For instance, Case did not proffer an alibi defense, as did the defendant in State
v. Lawrinson, 551 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1990)(holding that without specifying the




III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BILL OF
PARTICULARS AND PLEA IN BAR
The problem these Nebraska cases expose is that child sexual as-
sault cases present novel concerns for courts and prosecutors, chiefly
because of the child's inability to distinguish events accurately or com-
pletely.90 The child's mnemonic shortcomings conflict with the de-
fendant's right to notice of the charges against him. Traditionally,
notice is provided through the bill of particulars. It is arguable
whether or not this traditional means of notice is viable in child sexual
assault cases. Perhaps it is time for courts to recognize the shortcom-
ings of the bill of particulars in this class of cases, as the court appar-
ently did in Martinez II. Before courts altogether reject the bill of
particulars, it is worthwhile to consider its traditional function.
The Nebraska cases before Quick speak of a procedure whereby "a
defendant may allege and prove facts outside the record in support of
a plea of former adjudication" and that "[tihe remedy of a bill of partic-
ulars is available to assist a defendant in preparing his defense."91 As
previously stated, this Article takes the position that Quick lost sight
of the meaning of this language. This Part addresses what these
words meant up to the time of Piskorski.
The following is a key passage from State v. Milenkovich:92
"An indictment or information alone need not be fifll protection against
double jeopardy because a defendant may allege and prove facts outside the
record in support of a plea of former adjudication. The remedy of a bill of
particulars is available to assist a defendant in preparing his defense and to
protect him against a second prosecution for the same offense."
This language is in accord with the language of Section 29-1817 which pro-
vides that a defendant may present evidence outside the record to prove the
identity of the offenses. Consequently, a court may consider evidence beyond
the information in determining whether a prosecution violates the double
jeopardy clause. 93
Milenkovich recognized that section 29-1817 allows a defendant to
"adduce such other evidence as may be necessary to establish the
identity of the offense."94 The historical background of these words is
worth exploring. In particular, it is important to understand that the
bill originally had nothing to do with guaranteeing protection against
double jeopardy, but instead came to be a means under federal case
law of satisfying the Sixth Amendment when the government filed in-
definite charges. Through this federal tradition, the plea in bar be-
90. See, e.g., State v. Doan, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 484, 498 N.W.2d 804 (1993).
91. State v. Adams, 181 Neb. 75, 79, 147 N.W.2d 144, 149 (1966).
92. 236 Neb. 42, 458 N.W.2d 747 (1990).
93. Id. at 49-50, 458 N.W.2d at 751 (citations omitted)(quoting State v. Piskorski, 218
Neb. 543, 548, 357 N.W.2d 206, 210-11 (1984)).
94. Id. at 48, 458 N.W.2d at 751.
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came inseparably linked to the bill of particulars in Nebraska
jurisprudence.
A. Federal Influence
Tradition enters Nebraska cases from a common source, which is
based on the court's understanding of the bill of particulars and plea
in bar as described by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Myers
v. United States,95 the defendant was prosecuted for selling intoxicat-
ing liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The Eighth Cir-
cuit ruled that it was not error for the lower court to overrule the
defendant's motion to quash the indictment as too indefinite.96 Specif-
ically, the defendant argued that the indictment failed to allege the
name of the purchaser, a definite place of sale, the amount of the sale
price, the definite kind or character of the liquor, and an approxima-
tion of the alcoholic content thereof.9 7
The court remarked that the defendant never moved for a bill of
particulars to obtain these facts from the prosecution, but instead
sought only to quash the indictment.9 8 The court concluded that the
indictment was written substantially in the language of the statute,
stated all elements of the offense, and was not defective merely be-
cause further facts could have been supplied by a bill.99 The record
provided sufficient protection from double jeopardy because it pro-
vided specific details lacking in the charging documents, but even if
the record was not specific, a defendant could resort to parol evidence
to fill in the details.100 Therefore, in Myers, the court linked the bill
and the plea in bar as dual protection from an allegedly indefinite
indictment.
Federal cases before Myers also dealt with indefinite indictments.
Bartell v. United States,'Ol which involved an obscene letter the de-
fendant had deposited in the mail, draws upon earlier federal case law
based on English practice.' 02 In United States v. Claflin,103 upon
which Bartell relies, the court stated that
95. 15 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1926).
96. Id. at 979.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 986.
99. Id. at 981.
100. Id. at 982.
101. 227 U.S. 427 (1913).
102. For instance, Myers quotes Tubbs v. United States, 105 F. 59 (1900):
Defendants in this class of cases commonly affect ignorance of what they
are indicted for, and great apprehension lest they shall be indicted a sec-
ond time for the very same offense, and be unable to prove by the record
a former conviction or acquittal. No case of this kind has ever occurred,
or is ever likely to occur, but the affected apprehension of each defendant
that it may occur in his case is perennial. The supreme court has put a
quietus on these stock objections by repeatedly pointing out that the de-
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[iut is not necessary to describe property with such particularity as will obvi-
ate all necessity for proof outside the record to support a plea of once in jeop-
ardy. Says the court: 'here must be some parol evidence in all cases, to
show what it was he was tried for before."... If, in any case, such reasonable
details prove insufficient to enable the defendant to prepare his defence, all
possibility of injustice is removed by a bill of particulars, to which the defend-
ant is entitled upon making oath that further particulars are necessary to
enable him to defend.
1 0 4
Two aspects of these federal opinions are particularly noteworthy.
First, the cases required only "reasonable detail" in the charging docu-
ment. Further detail, if needed, could be provided by a bill of particu-
lars. Second, oral testimony could always supply what was lacking in
the paper record, including what was lacking in the bill of particulars.
These two aspects came to the fore in federal criminal practice
when the requirement that the indictment be prolix was gradually re-
placed by the rule that an indictment in the language of the statute
was sufficient. 0 5 The bill of particulars became a substitute for the
particularity that formerly was furnished by the indictment itself.
Eventually, the federal system recognized a defendant's right to a bill
of particulars, and this right was codified in Rule 7(f) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.10 6 This shift from prolixity to concision
is important because the historical trend in the federal courts found
its way into Nebraska case law. In Nebraska courts, however, the bill
of particulars has never been recognized by statute or rule. Instead, a
defendant's right to a bill is recognized only by case law.10 7 Thus, it is
fendant may apply for a bill of particulars, and that parol evidence is
always admissible, and sometimes necessary, to establish the defense of
prior conviction or acquittal.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
103. 25 F. Cas. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1875)(No. 14798).
104. Id. at 433-34 (citation omitted)(quoting Regina v. Mansfield, 174 Eng. Rep. 445,
446 (Q.B. 1841)).
105. See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 7(c)(1) (providing that "[t]he indictment or the informa-
tion shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged").
106. The court may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for a bill
of particulars may be made before arraignment or within ten days after
arraignment or at such later time as the court may permit. A bill of
particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as
justice requires.
Id. 7(f).
107. See State v. Wehrle, 223 Neb. 928, 933, 395 N.W.2d 142, 146 (1986).
A rationale for the rule that a formal criminal charge alleging commis-
sion of an offense anytime within the period prescribed by the statute of
limitations for commencement of prosecution is sufficient, and a likely
basis for Section 29-1501(3), is a common-law part of Nebraska criminal
procedure permitting an accused to utilize a bill of particulars for appro-
priate specification in allegations of a formal charge.
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no wonder the Nebraska courts have turned to federal practice for
guidance.
By contrast, in Nebraska the plea in bar is a statutory remedy. 0 8
The Nebraska cases before Quick speak of a procedure whereby "a de-
fendant may allege and prove facts outside the record in support of a
plea of former adjudication."1 0 9 Although the Nebraska cases link the
two procedures, historically the plea in bar had nothing to do with the
bill of particulars.
B. English Background
1. Plea in Bar
Although two methods for protecting a defendant against vague
charges appear together in the federal cases, historically they were
distinct. This distinction becomes apparent when focusing on com-
mentaries contemporaneous with Myers. In 1913, Bishop stated the
following in his treatise, New Criminal Procedure:
The Identity of the parties and of the offence, the defendant taking, as just
said, the burden of proof, is shown by parol. It is so even though the two
indictments are alike. A common method is to produce the testimony of per-
sons who were present at the previous trial as to what was there investigated;
and if it appears to be within the present indictment a prima facie case is
made, to be overcome only by proof from the other side of the diversity of the
two offences. Such witnesses need not be those of the former trial, the calling
of whom is not indispensable even though they are within reach of process. If
sentence was rendered against the party, proof that it was inflicted on the
present defendant proves his identity.1 1 0
The same procedure is found in Hale's treatise, Pleas of the Crown,
although in the mid-1600s,111 the plea in bar was referred to in Eng-
lish cases as the plea of autrefoits acquit or autrefoits convict.
If a man pleads autrefoits acquit de mesme felonie and vouch the record, the
court may examine proof, that it is the same felony, and thereupon allow it
without any solemn confession of the king's attorney, 26 Assiz. 15. But the
safest way is the confession of the king's attorney, or an inquest charged to
inquire, whether it be the same fact.1 1 2
Hale seems to mention three methods that would give rise to the
plea in bar: (1) producing the record to support the plea if the prosecu-
tor does not confess; (2) confession by the prosecutor; or (3) an inquest
108. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995).
109. State v. Adams, 181 Neb. 75, 79, 147 N.W.2d 144, 149 (1966).
110. 2 JOEL P. BISHOP, NEW CRIAMNAL PROCEDURE OR NEW CoItmiENTARIEs ON THE LAw
OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRnMi1NAL CASES § 816, at 634
(2d ed. 1913).
111. Although the full text of the History of the Pleas of the Crown was first published
in 1736 under editor Sollom Emlyn, it was the result of Hale's lifetime study of
criminal law. See EDMUND HEwARD, MATrHEw HALE 132-33 (1972). Hale lived
from 1609 to 1676.
112. 2 Sm MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 242-43 (1847).
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that decides after hearing testimony. The third procedure mentioned
can be found in the Nebraska statute, which states that at the hearing
on the plea in bar, "the trial of such issue [shall be] to the court or to a
jury, if the court desires to submit such issue to a jury."11 3 The Ne-
braska statute presumably refers to the "inquest," which Hale called
one of the safest ways to plead former jeopardy, and safer than merely
producing the record of the former trial. It presumably is safer be-
cause an inquest allows the defendant more information than the cold
record of the former proceeding.31 4
The conclusion to be drawn is that other than confession of the
plea, there are two ways to prove the plea: (1) the record, or (2) facts
outside the record, i.e., oral testimony that establishes the charges for
113. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995). The predecessor of this statute first
appeared in 1873. See GEN. STAT. 1873, ch. 58, § 449, at 822. Before 1873, Ne-
braska law established no statutory authority for the procedure. Prior to trial on
the plea, a prosecutor may demur to the plea and submit the question to the
judge to determine whether or not the facts as stated in the plea prevent a subse-
quent trial. See Arnold v. State, 38 Neb. 752, 57 N.W. 378 (1894); Murphy v.
State, 25 Neb. 807, 41 N.W. 792 (1889). If the prosecution joins issue with the
plea in bar by replying to it, the issue must be tried at an evidentiary hearing,
which may be before a jury. In Arnold v. State, 38 Neb. 752, 57 N.W. 378 (1894),
the supreme court held that a judge always must submit the plea in bar to a jury
because the original statute read "and on the trial of such issue to a jury." Id. at
754, 57 N.W. at 379. See also Bush v. State, 55 Neb. 195, 75 N.W. 542 (1898). In
1927, the Nebraska Legislature amended the statute to read as it does today:
"and on the trial of such issue to the court or to a jury if the court desires to
submit such issue to a jury." 1927 Neb. Laws 222-23. When a court overrules a
plea in bar, it is a final, appealable order. See State v. Woodfork, 239 Neb. 720,
478 N.W.2d 248 (1991); State v. Milenkovich, 236 Neb. 42, 49, 458 N.W.2d 747,
751 (1990). In England, issues of former jeopardy, after reply, are tried solely to
the court. See 11(2) HALSBUR's LAws OF ENGLAND % 970, at 817 (Lord Hailsham
ed., 4th ed. 1990). "If the prosecution replies, it is for the judge, without the pres-
ence of a jury, to decide the issue." Id. In federal practice, the procedure is simi-
lar to a motion to suppress. See 8 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: A PROBLEM SOLVING
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
§ 22:312, at 602 (rev. 1992).
114. The record alone usually is held sufficient. See, e.g., 29A AM. JUR. 2D § 1494
(1994).
To sustain a plea of former jeopardy, the defendant must introduce suffi-
cient evidence to affirmatively show that: (1) there was a former prosecu-
tion in the same state for the same offense; (2) that some person was in
jeopardy on the first prosecution; (3) that the persons are identical in the
two prosecutions; (4) and that the particular offense, on the prosecution
of which the jeopardy attached, was such an offense as to constitute a
bar. Where the record of the former prosecution exists, the production of
it, either by the original or a certified copy, is proper and sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the plea .... The defendant must sustain a plea of
former jeopardy by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. (citations omitted). For a concise history of the common law of double jeop-
ardy, see Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New




which the accused had been acquitted or convicted. The passage from
Bishop shows that anyone who was present at the former trial is com-
petent to testify at the hearing on the plea at bar. The passage from
Hale indicates that the defendant may even resort to testimony of the
justices of the peace.115
2. Bill of Particulars
Historically, in respect to securing protection for double jeopardy,
the plea in bar antedates the use of the bill of particulars. English
criminal practice borrowed the bill of particulars from English civil
law. One commentator has expressed that
[alIthough unknown to the ancient common law, the bill of particulars
came to be used initially under the common law counts in the actions of debt
and assumpsit. There was no need at common law for a bill of particulars in
criminal cases because the accusation of old was sufficiently informative; in-
deed, because its allegations were prolix, verbose and repetitive, the early
form of accusation was informative to a fault.
116
115. Hale states that a defendant's "plea [is] allowed by the testimony of the justices of
peace before whom he was acquit." 2 Sm MVATrHw HALE, supra note 112, at 243.
116. 2 CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 325, at 485 (13th ed.
1990).
A bill of particulars, even in civil cases, was unknown to the ancient com-
mon law, and its use in later times is said to have arisen under the com-
mon law counts in actions of debt and assumpsit .... In criminal cases
the common law required directness and particularity in the averments
of the indictment, and there was no need in general for a note of the
matters to be given in evidence to be furnished to the defendant, and
there was no practice of that sort except in special cases, . . . [such as a
charge of being] a common barrator or a common scold .... But in gen-
eral all the particulars required to be given are charged in the body of
the indictment, and the practice of giving the bills of particulars has
been unknown among us.
Id. § 325, at 485 n.39 (quoting Westbrooks v. State, 25 So. 491 (Miss. 1899)).
Even though the early form of indictment was verbose, a bill of particulars was
routinely granted in certain types of criminal cases, such as conspiracy, embez-
zlement, nuisance, and barratry. See Rex v. Hamilton, 173 Eng. Rep. 199 (K-B.
1836)(conspiracy); Regina v. Ward, 2 L.T.O.S. 352 (1844)(conspiracy); Regina v.
Alleyne, 18 L.T.O.S. 99 (1851)(conspiracy); Regina v. Rycroft, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 76
(Q.B. 1852)(conspiracy); Rex v. Bootyman, 172 Eng. Rep. 986 (KB. 1832)(embez-
zlement); Regina v. Flower, 3 Jurist 558 (Q.B. 1839)(nuisance); The King v.
Grove, 87 Eng. Rep. 493 (KB. 1694)(barratry); The King v. Ward, 88 Eng. Rep.
1488 (K.B. 1701)(barratry).
In Rex v. Hamilton, 173 Eng. Rep. 199 (1836), Justice Littledale applied civil
law rules to the criminal law.
I think that the ordering of particulars in cases like the present [i.e.,
conspiracy], is a highly beneficial practice, and I also think that a partic-
ular should give the same information that a special count does. The
first count in this indictment, in my opinion, states enough without any
particular; the effect of a particular being, when a count is framed in a
general form, to give the opposite party the same information that he
would give if there was a special count. I have always understood this to
be the rule with respect to particulars in civil cases.
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In fact, English cases never mention the bill of particulars as a
means for securing double jeopardy protection. In England, the tradi-
tional function of the bill was to furnish information to the accused
concerning the facts upon which the charges were based. In English
practice, the bill has always been distinct from the plea in bar. The
two became linked in the United States only after federal practice be-
gan to permit prosecutors to allege the bare elements of the offense.11l
At the time of United States v. Claflin,118 the federal courts began
to hold that the Sixth Amendment required only reasonable notice
and if insufficient, then the defendant should ask for a bill of particu-
lars.119 Nevertheless, the bill primarily provided notice to the accused
of the charges against him under the Sixth Amendment; the bill did
not function as a guarantee against double jeopardy, although the fed-
eral courts, as in Claftin, stated that if the accused claimed the allega-
tions were so vague as to create a problem with double jeopardy upon
retrial, the bill would provide notice and limit the government's proof.
The federal courts further stated that if the record was insufficient,
the defendant could resort to parol evidence outside the record, as was
the tradition from England. The federal courts viewed the bill and the
hearing on the plea in bar as two methods of supplementing the in-
dictment when the defendant claimed the language of the indictment
would not protect against a second prosecution.
Therefore, despite its linkage in federal cases with the plea in bar,
the bill of particulars always maintained its traditional function,
namely to particularize a general count; courts assigned the function
of identifying identical offenses for double jeopardy purposes only
when pleading the bare elements came into vogue. In practice, there-
fore, the plea in bar and the bill of particulars must be distinguished,
although they have been linked formulaically in Nebraska law since
the time of Myers v. United States.120
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH QUICK
In light of the foregoing discussion, Quick is subject to two criti-
cisms. First, Quick never clearly distinguished between the functions
of the plea in bar and the bill of particulars. Second, the Quick court
Id. at 201-02.
117. The likely origin of the linkage in the United States is United States v. Claflin, 25
F. Cas. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1875)(No. 14798). Although the defendant in Regina v.
Mansfield, 174 Eng. Rep. 445 (Q.B. 1841), did raise the issue of whether an in-
dictment describing a stolen tin as "25 lbs. weight of tin" rather than two "ingots"
would enable the defendant to plead autrefoits acquit, Mansfield did not concern
a motion for a bill of particulars.
118. 25 F. Cas. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1875)(No. 14798).
119. See United States v. Glup, 482 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1973).
120. 15 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1926).
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insisted on a clear record-subsequent prosecution is barred if, and
only if, the record of the former prosecution establishes which incident
is the basis of conviction. The tradition, however, always allowed a
defendant to go outside the record.
One function the Quick court assigned to the bill of particulars was
to force the prosecution to reveal which incident forms the basis for
the subsequent prosecution. "If faced with a future prosecution for
sexual assault of the victim, [the defendant] might file a bill of particu-
lars to force the State to specify which assault was being alleged in the
subsequent prosecution. However, the State could pick whichever al-
leged assault it preferred."121 Yet, this function was never contem-
plated for the bill of particulars in the course of its history. Even in
Bartell the court conceived of the bill as a means of creating a record
in the first prosecution by supplementing the vagueness in the charg-
ing instrument. History makes clear that a bill was a remedy only for
indefinite charges upon a first prosecution, not a substitute for the
proceeding provided by section 29-1817. With the benefit of hindsight,
the facts in Quick should have been analyzed as in Myers-the Quick
court should have taken notice of the defendant's failure to move for a
bill of particulars in the first prosecution. Had he done so, he would
have a record in the event of a subsequent prosecution.
Second, the Quick court stated that it was unable to conceive of
facts within or outside the record to protect the defendant in the event
of a subsequent prosecution. Prior precedent, however, never condi-
tioned the bar of double jeopardy on a clear record at the first trial and
never inquired into whether facts conceivably barred a subsequent
prosecution. The hearing on the plea in bar traditionally has been
considered sufficient protection not just because a record of the former
proceeding identifies the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
Rather, the hearing on the plea is considered sufficient protection be-
cause the defendant can present whatever is necessary to prove for-
mer jeopardy. If the defendant asserts that the second prosecution is
barred by the former prosecution, the State must either specify the
transaction it claims is not barred or the State must confess the plea
in bar. The State cannot pick any transaction, as the Quick opinion
asserted, because the defendant may then put the State to its trial at
the hearing on the plea in bar by calling the victim, who will testify
that she cannot distinguish one transaction from another.
121. State v. Quick, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 756, 767, 511 N.W.2d 168, 174 (1993), overruled
by State v. Martinez, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996).
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V. CONCLUSION: A FEW PROPOSALS ON BILL OF
PARTICULARS ISSUES
Based on the forgoing analysis of the cases and history, Martinez 11
left one issue unresolved. This Part recommends ways judges and
practitioners ought to deal with these motions.
The first question is whether the bill of particulars is completely
supplanted by the blanket bar as a means of preserving protection
against double jeopardy. Apparently, the bill of particulars has been
supplanted by the blanket bar in child sexual assault cases. But in
other types of criminal cases, the bill of particulars still serves as pro-
tection from indefinite or vague allegations because it furnishes notice
of the charges and an opportunity to prepare a defense. Courts must
exercise caution in criminal cases not involving sex crimes against
children.122 Yet, even in child sexual assault cases, it appears from
Martinez H that the bill still has some function if the state can specify
particular events that define the time frame of the information. 123
Second, courts should not habitually deny a motion for a bill of par-
ticulars because the blanket bar may present grounds for reversal on
appeal. Both Martinez opinions deal exclusively with the Sixth
Amendment justification for providing notice in the information. The
bill still provides notice, even after recognizing the blanket bar. The
Case opinion, however, muddles the issue. In Case, the defendant ar-
gued that he needed the bill for Sixth Amendment purposes, yet the
appeals court incorrectly treated this as a motion to quash.124 Even if
a defendant fails to file a motion to quash, he still may be entitled to a
bill of particulars. A motion to quash attacks the validity of the infor-
mation, while a motion for a bill admits its validity.
Obviously, because of the blanket bar, a bill of particulars is unnec-
essary for double jeopardy purposes upon an initial prosecution, but it
traditionally provides Sixth Amendment protection by providing no-
tice of the charges so the defendant can prepare his defense and use
the record to plead former jeopardy. Defense attorneys still must ask
for the bill to preserve error. When a second information is filed, the
bill formerly granted will elucidate whether the prosecutor is basing
122. See supra subsection 1.C.2.
123. See State v. Martinez, 4 Neb. Ct. App. 192, 205, 541 N.W.2d 406, 414-15 (1995),
affd, 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996):
When only one sexual assault within the charging period is determi-
nable as having occurred during that period by linkage to another event,
which then furnishes a reasonably definite time for an offense, the re-
quirement of the Double Jeopardy Clause that the defendant be able to
plead the conviction as a bar to further prosecution is satisfied when
used in conjunction with a "blanket bar" for the time period in the charg-
ing information.
Id.
124. See supra subsection II.D.1.
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the second prosecution on the same facts. On appeal, however, the
defendant cannot argue that denial of the bill in the former prosecu-
tion was prejudicial until a subsequent prosecution has begun. No
prejudice can be claimed because the defendant always had the rem-
edy of the plea in bar and the hearing authorized by section 29-1817.
This aspect of the tradition confused the court in Quick and often still
confuses defendants, courts, and prosecutors today. Only unfair sur-
prise can prejudice a defendant after denial of the bill.
In sexual assault cases, defendants ask for bills of particular for a
number of reasons, but only the Sixth Amendment furnishes a suffi-
cient ground for the bill after Martinez. Trial courts should not deny
such requests merely because the defendant has not moved to quash
the information. On the other hand, trial courts should deny such re-
quests when the State cannot allege facts with sufficient specificity,
and courts must not treat them as substitute for discovery. If the
State furnishes discovery and cannot be more specific, a court should
deny the motion. 125
125. See Teilhier, supra note 31, at 448-50.
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